however, even while being acknowledged as an underlying feature of modern geopolitical organization, territoriality has been treated within mainstream social science as a relatively fixed, unproblematic, and inconsequential property of statehood. Just as a fish is unlikely to discover water, most postwar social scientists viewed national state territories as pregiven natural environments for sociopolitical life (Taylor 1994: 157) . Indeed, most scholars of modern politics and society have long embraced each of the state-centric geographical assumptions that were critically discussed in the previous chapter-spatial fetishism; methodological territorialism; and methodological nationalism. Consequently, in Agnew's (1994) memorable phrase, a 'territorial trap' has underpinned mainstream approaches to social science insofar as they have conceived state territoriality as a static background structure for regulatory processes and sociopolitical struggles rather than as one of their constitutive dimensions.
Such assumptions had some measure of epistemological plausibility during the Fordist-Keynesian period, in which a historically unprecedented territorial enclosure of political-economic space was attempted (Lipietz 1994) . Today, however, they have become major intellectual barriers to a more adequate conceptualization of ongoing sociospatial transformations. For, in the context of contemporary debates on globalization, state-centric geographical assumptions have underpinned the unhelpful polarization of positions between proponents of the view that national states remain fully sovereign territorial power-containers and those who contend that state regulatory capacities are being eroded (see Ch. 2 above). Whereas the first position is generally grounded upon a static understanding of state territoriality as a fixed, unchanging grid of national borders, the second position can envision state restructuring only as a process of contraction or disappearance in which territoriality is being rendered obsolete. This debate narrows the conceptualization of state territoriality to two equally limiting possibilities-its presence or its absenceand thus precludes a more contextually sensitive investigation of processes of state spatial restructuring.
During the last decade, these entrenched methodological assumptions have been called into question, particularly by scholars working in the interstices of established disciplinary divisions of labor. As many analysts within this heterodox strand of social science have noted, the global political-economic transformations of the post-1970s period have reconfigured the Westphalian formation of state territoriality (a) by decentering the national scale of state regulatory activity and (b) by undermining the internal coherence of national economies and national civil societies. Under these conditions, the apparently ossified fixity of long-established, nationally organized formations of state territoriality has been thrust dramatically into historical motion. Contemporary scholars are thus confronted with the daunting but exciting task of developing new categories and methods through which to decipher these emergent, post-Westphalian landscapes of statehood.
Much of the new research on state spatiality can be situated within a broader body of critical social science concerned to counter neoliberal globalization narratives by emphasizing the essential role of state institutions in promoting market-based regulatory reform throughout the world economy. Thus, among the many arguments that have been advanced regarding the emergent institutional architectures of post-Keynesian states, contemporary discussions of state spatial restructuring are distinguished above all by their emphasis on the qualitatively new geographical scales and territorial contours of statecraft that have been crystallizing in recent decades. This ongoing reconceptualization of state space has been extraordinarily multifaceted, both methodologically and thematically, but it has thus far focused upon at least three intertwined axes of state spatial restructuring.
1. State reterritorialization. The meaning, organization, and functions of state territoriality are being reexamined in the context of debates on neomedievalism, perforated sovereignties, the internationalization of statehood, and the increased importance of dematerialized, flow-based economic transactions under globalizing capitalism. Territoriality is thus no longer viewed as a pregiven, self-enclosed platform for political relations, but is now being analyzed as a historically specific strategy of spatial enclosure and as an evolving, multiscalar institutional configuration (Kobrin 1998; Ruggie 1993; D. Newman 1999) .
2. State rebordering. The changing roles of state boundaries in the new geopolitical order are being systematically explored with reference to issues such as economic governance, citizenship, immigration, cross-border regions, military violence, and politico-cultural identities. Boundaries are thus no longer viewed as exclusively national demarcators of state sovereignty but are now understood as multifaceted semiotic, symbolic, and politicaleconomic practices through which state power is articulated and contested (Newman and Paasi 1998; MacMillan and Linklater 1995; Perkmann and Sum 2002) .
3. State rescaling. In contrast to the earlier fetishization of the national scale of political power, scholars have begun to analyze a range of rescaling processes through which new, multiscalar hierarchies of state institutional organization, political authority, and regulatory conflict are being generated. The scalar organization of state power is thus no longer understood as a permanently fixed background structure, but is now viewed as a constitutive, contested, and therefore potentially malleable dimension of politicaleconomic processes (Swyngedouw 1997; Smith 1995; Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997) .
At the present time, our understanding of the new state spaces that are currently emerging remains relatively rudimentary. Nonetheless, recent contributions to this multidisciplinary literature have clearly illuminated the historically constructed and politically contested character of state spatiality, The State Spatial Process 71 thereby opening up a number of productive methodological and empirical starting points through which the changing geographies of contemporary statehood may be explored more systematically. 1 Despite these accomplishments, much recent work on the production of new state spaces has proceeded without an explicit theoretical foundation. In many contributions to this literature, the geographical dimensions of state power are treated in descriptive terms, as merely one among many aspects of statehood that are currently undergoing systemic changes. Relatedly, the causal forces underlying contemporary processes of state spatial restructuring are often not explicitly specified. Yet, given the tumultuous political-geographical transformations that have been unfolding during the last three decades, there is arguably an increasingly urgent need for more systematic theoretical reflection on the nature and dynamics of state spatiality. Of particular importance, in this context, is a sustained inquiry into the conditions under which inherited geographies of state space may be transformed from relatively fixed, stabilized settings in which state regulatory operations occur into potentially malleable stakes of sociopolitical contestation. Concomitantly, there is an equally urgent need for a more explicit theoretical conceptualization of the determinate social, political, and economic processes through which transformations of state space unfold.
The present chapter confronts these tasks in a series of intertwined steps. My overarching goal is to elaborate the theoretical foundations for the analysis of state rescaling and urban governance restructuring that will be developed in subsequent chapters. The next section introduces some initial methodological premises and categories through which the geographies of state space under modern capitalism may be analyzed. On this basis, I demonstrate how the issues of spatiality, territoriality, and geographical scale may be integrated, at a foundational level, into the conceptualization of modern statehood. Building upon the strategic-relational approach to state theory developed by Jessop (1990a) , I argue that state space is best conceptualized as an arena, medium, and outcome of spatially selective political strategies. I then extend this conceptualization by outlining some of the broad institutional and geographical parameters within which state space has evolved during the course of capitalist development. This line of analysis generates a multidimensional conceptual framework through which to investigate contextually specific pathways of state spatial restructuring. It also enables me to introduce a stylized model of state spatial restructuring in western Europe since the early 1960s, that serves to demarcate the theoretical and empirical terrain on which the remainder of this book is situated.
Methodological preliminaries: spatial process, spatial form, and spatial scale
Is not the secret of the State, hidden because it is so obvious, to be found in space?
Henri Lefebvre (2003a: 87) Prior to the current renaissance of spatially attuned approaches to state theory, classical political geographers had already introduced a number of descriptive categories through which to map the spatial contours of state operations and political life. Some scholars addressed the issues of territoriality, borders, core/periphery structures, geopolitics, and war-making; others focused on various aspects of the state's internal spatial structure, such as federalism, administrative differentiation, gerrymandering, metropolitan jurisdictional fragmentation, and territorial politics (for overviews see Taylor 2003 Taylor , 1993 . By acknowledging the socially constructed and politically contested character of political jurisdictions at a variety of scales, certain strands of this literature managed at least partially to circumvent the territorial trap of state-centrism even during its historical highpoint under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism. However, classical approaches to political geography contained a number of major theoretical deficiencies, including (depending on the context) an excessively physicalist and deterministic conception of geographical influence, an excessive reliance upon biological or organic metaphors, a pervasive functionalism, a naturalization of liberal democracy as a political form, and a bracketing of the broader geoeconomic contexts of state activities (Taylor 1993) . It is only during the last thirty years, in conjunction with the intensified interest in critical social theory and radical political economy among human geographers and other spatially attuned scholars (Gregory and Urry 1985) , that the geographies of state power have been analyzed in a more contextually specific manner and related explicitly to the historical dynamics of capitalist development. The key concern, from this point of view, has been to analyze 'the historical relationship between territorial states and the broader social and economic structures and geopolitical orders (or forms of spatial practice) in which these states must operate' (Agnew and Corbridge 1994: 100). Additionally, contributors to the new literature on the political geographies of statehood have investigated the role of state spatial arrangements in mediating, reproducing, and solidifying everyday power relations at a variety of geographical scales.
As argued in the previous chapter, state-centrism entails the freezing of political-economic life within reified, national-territorial structures that are presumed to defy historical change. Consequently, state-centric assumptions generate a systemic blindness to the possibility of major ruptures within inherited formations of sociospatial organization. Such assumptions are deeply problematic, not only as a basis for the investigation of contemporary sociospatial transformations, but also as a means for analyzing the changing geographies of state institutions themselves, whether in historical or contemporary contexts. Therefore, in contrast to the spatial fetishism, methodological territorialism, and methodological nationalism that continue to pervade mainstream social science, the present analysis begins from a radically different theoretical starting point. For my purposes here, state space is conceptualized (a) as an ongoing process of change rather than as a static thing, container, or platform; (b) as having a polymorphic rather than a merely territorial geographical form; and (c) as having a multiscalar rather than merely a national organizational structure (Fig. 3.1) .
The goal of this section is to add some preliminary descriptive content to these opening propositions. I shall then explicate their theoretical foundations in greater detail and outline some of their substantive implications.
STATE-CENTRIC ASSUMPTION CRITICAL ALTERNATIVE

Spatial fetishism
• State space is viewed as timeless and static, and thus as immune to the possibility of systemic change A processual conceptualization of state space . . .
• State space is conceived as an ongoing process of political-economic regulation and institutional change
Methodological territorialism
• State territoriality is viewed as an unchanging, fixed, or permanent aspect of modern statehood;
• The geography of state space is reduced to its territorial dimensions emphasizing its polymorphic geographies . . .
• The geographies of statehood are conceived as polymorphic, multifaceted, and continually evolving;
• Territoriality is viewed as one among many geographical dimensions of state space
Methodological nationalism
• The national scale is viewed, in ontological terms, as the logically primary level of political power in the modern interstate system at a multiplicity of spatial scales
• State regulation and political struggle are said to unfold at a variety of intertwined spatial scales;
• State scalar organization and scalar divisions of state regulation are said to evolve historically and, on occasion, to be significantly restructured 
The state spatial process: a first cut
In what sense is state spatiality a process rather than a container, a platform, or a thing? Since the seminal contributions of radical urbanists such as Lefebvre (1991 Lefebvre ( [1974 ), Harvey (1973 ), Castells (1977 [1972 ), and Soja (1980) over two decades ago, processual approaches to the production of social spatiality have been mobilized extensively in the field of critical urban and regional studies (Gottdiener 1985; Soja 2000) . Surprisingly, the methodological insights of critical urban researchers and other geographically inclined social scientists have had only a minimal impact upon the fields of state theory and political sociology. I would argue, nonetheless, that the conceptualizations of sociospatial dynamics that were developed in these pioneering analyses of urban spatiality may be fruitfully mobilized to investigate the production and transformation of state spatiality as well.
2
Much like the term 'city', the term 'state' ostensibly connotes a fixed, thinglike entity-in this case, a closed institutional system that occupies a bordered geographical territory, as represented in the colors allotted to each country on a world map. Yet, as theorists of dialectics have argued (Ollman 1993; Harvey 1996) , a reification of processes of change is entrenched within the conceptual grammar of mainstream social science, leading scholars to presume unreflexively the existence of stasis, fixity, and continuity even in the face of compelling evidence of flux, fluidity, and transformation. Along with other foundational sociological concepts such as economy, society, and culture, the notions of the city and the state are arguably among the paradigmatic exemplars of this pervasive reification of sociospatial dynamics within the modern social sciences.
Over two decades ago, radical urban scholars began to break out of these intellectual constraints by introducing more dialectical, processual concepts for describing the contemporary city-for instance, urbanization or, in Harvey's (1978) more precise terminology, the urban process. Against traditional approaches to urban locational analysis, which conceived space in EuclidianCartesian terms, as a flat surface upon which economic activity is extended, Harvey introduced a more dynamic, historically specific view. For Harvey, the urban must be understood simultaneously as a presupposition, a medium, and an outcome of the conflictual, continually changing social relations of capitalism. From this perspective, any historical configuration of urban spatiality represents a sedimented crystallization of earlier patterns of social interaction and an evolving grid of possibilities for, and constraints upon, future social relations.
2 Henri Lefebvre is one of the few sociospatial theorists to have analyzed systematically both the production of urban space and the production of state space. While Lefebvre's writings on cities are now quite well known among Anglo-American urbanists (see e.g. Lefebvre 2003b Lefebvre , 1996 , his major writings on the state have not been extensively translated and thus remain relatively obscure among English-language readers (see Lefebvre 1978 Lefebvre , 1977 Lefebvre , 1976a . Recent, abridged translations of key state-theoretical writings include Lefebvre 2003a , 2003c , 2001 . For interpretations and commentaries, see Elden 2004 Brenner 2001c Brenner , 1998a Brenner , 1997a A directly analogous methodological strategy can, I propose, be developed in order to conceptualize the state spatial process under capitalism. Much like the geography of the city, the geography of state spatiality must be viewed as a presupposition, an arena, and an outcome of continually evolving political strategies. It is not a thing, container, or platform, but a socially produced, conflictual, and dynamically changing matrix of sociospatial interaction. The spaces of state power are not simply 'filled', as if they were pregiven territorial containers. Instead, state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through regulatory projects and sociopolitical struggles articulated in diverse institutional sites and at a range of geographical scales. Therefore, the traditional Westphalian image of states as being located within static, self-contained territorial arenas must be replaced by a dialectical, processual analysis of how historically specific configurations of state space are produced and incessantly reworked.
This proposition can be illustrated most directly with reference to the phenomenon of state territoriality, the dimension of political space which, as discussed in the preceding chapter, has been acknowledged and analyzed most explicitly in twentieth-century social science. The entrenched legacy of Euclidian/Cartesian geographical approaches to territoriality is epitomized in Weber's (1946) approach to political sociology, in which self-enclosed territorial borders were included as one of the essential definitional features of modern political organization. While Weber was highly sensitive to the historical specificity of modern state territoriality relative to premodern political geographies, he was considerably less interested in its evolution within the modern interstate system. Accordingly, in his major writings on political sociology, Weber reduced the issue to a point on a definitional checklist that could be presupposed relatively unproblematically in any discussion of modern bureaucratic states. This treatment of territoriality as a pregiven, fixed, unchanging, and thus relatively transparent feature of modern statehood has been reproduced unreflexively in most twentieth-century approaches to statehood, from theories of liberal democracy and realist approaches to international relations theory to major strands of development studies, mainstream analyses of social policy, and traditional Marxist debates on the relative autonomy of the state. While not empirically false, the Weberian definitional insight must be resituated within a more dialectical, historically specific conceptual framework. For, even following the historical-geographical watershed associated with the Treaty of Westphalia, in which the principle of state territorial sovereignty was first institutionalized (Spruyt 1994; Ruggie 1993) , borders have never been static, pregiven features of state power. Rather, their functions within the modern geopolitical and geoeconomic system have been modified, sometimes dramatically, through historically specific regulatory strategies and sociopolitical struggles (Agnew and Corbridge 1994; Newman and Paasi 1998) . Since the long sixteenth century, the national state's role as a territorial powercontainer has hinged upon an expanding repertoire of regulatory activitiesincluding (a) war-making and military defense; (b) the containment and enhancement of national economic wealth; (c) the promotion of nationalized politico-cultural identities; (d) the institutionalization of democratic forms of political legitimation; and (e) the provision of social welfare (Taylor 1994). Thus, from the war machines of early modern Europe and the wealth containers of the mercantile era to the national developmentalist states of the second industrial revolution and the Keynesian welfare national states of the FordistKeynesian period, national states have deployed a variety of regulatory strategies, and have attempted to contain a broad range of social, political, and economic activities, through the principle of territoriality. While the national state may have indeed 'acted like a vortex sucking in social relations to mould them through its territoriality' (Taylor 1994: 152) throughout much of the history of modern capitalism, this territorialization of political life has never been accomplished 'once and for all'. It must be understood, instead, as a precarious, contentious outcome of historically specific state projects of territorial enclosure (Paasi 1996) . To the extent that national states have ever appeared to have captured politics through their territoriality, this situation has never represented more than a temporary moment of stabilization within ongoing struggles over their geographical architectures, regulatory operations, and political orientations. The role of territorial borders as modalities of spatial encagement is thus best understood as a medium and result of political strategies rather than as a fixed, permanent condition.
Polymorphic political geographies
Territoriality represents only one, albeit crucial, dimension within the multilayered geographical architectures of modern state spatiality. The processual conceptualization of state territoriality sketched in the preceding paragraphs can thus be extended to illuminate a number of additional aspects of state spatiality that likewise operate as arenas, products, and stakes of ongoing regulatory strategies and sociopolitical struggles. It is useful, in this context, to distinguish two closely intertwined dimensions of state spatiality-state space in the 'narrow' sense; and state space in the 'integral' sense (Brenner et al. 2003b: 6) . 4 This distinction provides an initial analytical basis on which to conceptualize the polymorphic character of state spatiality under modern capitalism. First, state space in the narrow sense refers to the state's distinctive form of spatial organization as a discrete, territorially centralized, self-contained, and internally differentiated institutional apparatus. This aspect of state space refers, above all, to the changing configuration of state territoriality and to the evolving role of borders, boundaries, and frontiers in the modern interstate system, as sketched above. Additionally, state space in the narrow sense encompasses the changing geographies of state territorial organization and administrative differentiation within national jurisdictional boundaries. With the possible exception of small-scale city-states, most state apparatuses exhibit a significant degree of internal territorial differentiation insofar as they are subdivided among multiple administrative tiers that are allotted specific regulatory tasks (Painter and Goodwin 1995) . Within modern national states, this internal territorial differentiation has entailed the establishment of intergovernmental hierarchies and place-and region-specific institutional forms in which particular types of spaces-such as urban areas, metropolitan economies, rural peripheries, border zones, and so forth-are encompassed under distinctive administrative arrangements. The resultant scalar divisions of regulation may provide a relatively stabilized framework for state activities during a given period; but such scalar arrangements may also be unsettled as opposing sociopolitical forces struggle to reorganize the institutional structure, borders, or functions of subnational administrative units (K. Cox 1990) .
Second, state space in the integral sense refers to the territory-, place-and scale-specific ways in which state institutions are mobilized to regulate social relations and to influence their locational geographies. This aspect of state space refers, most centrally, to the changing geographies of state intervention into socioeconomic processes within a given territorial jurisdiction. Each historical formation of state spatiality is associated with policy frameworks that target specific jurisdictions, places, and scales as focal points for state regulation, public investments, and financial aid (Jones 1999) . Through this process of spatial targeting, state institutions attempt, for instance, to enhance territorially specific locational assets, to accelerate the circulation of capital, to reproduce the labor force, to address place-specific socioeconomic problems and to maintain territorial cohesion within and among diverse centers of economic activity and population growth.
5 Thus early industrial capitalist states channeled massive public investments into large-scale territorial infrastructures such as railroads, roads, ports, and canals. These strategies were eventually complemented by state-led initiatives to regulate urban living and working conditions and to establish large-scale public works facilities (such as hospitals, schools, energy grids, mass transportation networks, waste management systems) within major metropolitan areas. Following the second industrial revolution, the large-scale bureaucratic states of western Europe came to promote the entire national territory as an integrated geographical framework for economic growth. In this context, relatively non-industrialized rural and peripheral regions were targeted in redistributive state projects that aimed to spread urban industrial growth more evenly throughout the national territory (see Ch. 4). Most recently, following the global economic crisis of the 1970s, major urban and regional economies across western Europe have become strategically important spatial targets for a range of socioeconomic, industrial, and infrastructural policies that aim to enhance national competitive advantages (see Ch. 5).
In addition to these explicit spatial policies, state space in the integral sense also encompasses the indirect sociospatial effects that flow from apparently aspatial policies. There are two distinct aspects of this phenomenon (Jones 1999: 237-8) . On the one hand, apparently aspatial policies may impact particular locations, or particular social groups within those locations, in distinctive ways. For instance, military spending in the USA is not only a form of industrial policy that subsidizes particular sectors, such as aerospace and shipbuilding, but also a form of spatial policy that generates significant employment growth in major industrial regions such as Los Angeles and Seattle. Analogously, US government-sponsored mortgage subsidies and homeowner tax breaks tend to privilege suburban areas rather than cities, in which rental housing predominates. On the other hand, many national state policies generate uneven spatial effects due to their interaction with locationally specific conditions. For example, national workfare policies may facilitate enhanced employment in buoyant local labor markets while eliciting the opposite effect within depressed local economies (Jones 1999: 238) . Analogously, centrally delegated programs to create new forms of regional economic governance may generate radically divergent policy agendas in different locations due to the impacts of place-specific industrial conditions, institutional legacies, and political alliances (MacKinnon 2001) . The uneven development of state regulation therefore represents an important dimension of state space in the integral sense.
The narrow and integral aspects of state space-including territoriality, territorial differentiation, spatial targeting, and indirect spatial effectsinteract reciprocally to produce historically specific formations of state spatiality. Consequently, as Lefebvre (1991: 281) explains: 'each new form of state, each new form of political power, introduces its own particular way of partitioning space, its own particular administrative classification of discourses about space and about things and people in space. Each such form commands space, as it were, to serve its purposes.' The main elements of the conceptualization of state spatiality developed thus far are summarized schematically in Fig. 3 .2 (overleaf).
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The spaces of state power are not simply 'filled', as if they were pregiven territorial containers. Instead, state spatiality is actively produced and transformed through sociopolitical struggles at various geographical scales. The geography of statehood must therefore be viewed as a presupposition, arena, and outcome of evolving social relations 
STATE SPACE IN THE NARROW SENSE
State scalar configurations
Before we can further unpack the methodological foundations for this dialectical, processual, and polymorphic conceptualization of the state spatial process under capitalism, one additional issue must be addressed-the question of the state's distinctive, historically evolving scalar configuration. As we have already seen, most political sociologists, political economists, and state theorists have unreflexively presupposed that 'the' state is necessarily organized as a national state and, by implication, that sovereignty and territoriality are permanently bundled together at a national scale. Given the pervasive nationalization of political-economic life that was pursued during the course of the twentieth century, such assumptions have, until relatively recently, had some measure of plausibility both in social theory and in everyday life. They are, however, directly at odds with the conception of the state spatial process introduced above, according to which all aspects of the state's geographical architecture, including its scalar configuration, represent expressions of ongoing processes of political-economic regulation and sociopolitical contestation rather than permanently fixed features of statehood as such. Therefore, state scalar configurations must be conceptualized in a manner that is explicitly attuned to the historicity, and thus the malleability, of each scale of state institutional organization, regulatory activity, and political struggle.
Shaw (2000) has recently developed a useful framework for confronting this issue. For Shaw, every historical formation of state spatiality is 'layered' among a variety of distinct but intertwined power centers and tiers of political authority both above and below the national scale. However, as Shaw is quick to emphasize, some scales or 'layers' of state power are subordinate to others, and thus not every level of political authority can be said to constitute, in itself, a distinct state apparatus. Shaw's explicit recognition of the layered, multiscalar character of state power opens up the fundamental question of 'why a given layer [ . . . ] of state is seen as defining a particular period' (Shaw 2000: 189). Shaw's response-which he presents as an extension of Mann's (1993) definition of statehood-is of considerable relevance to the present study. According to Shaw (2000: 190;  italics in original): 'to be considered a state, a particular power centre must be [ . . . ] to a significant degree inclusive and constitutive of other forms or layers of state power (i.e. of state power in general in a particular time and space).' The crucial point, therefore, is that the question of which scale of regulatory activity is primary within a given configuration of state power is essentially an empirical-historical one, and not a matter that can be settled on an a priori basis. Consequently, even though the national scale of statehood has long encompassed and largely constituted those layers of political authority that exist at other scales, 'there is no reason to regard any particular layer of state power as intrinsically incapable of constituting statehood' (Shaw 2000: 189; italics added). Moreover, even when a given scale of state power successfully encompasses and constitutes other scales of political authority, the latter still generally play key roles within the broader, multiscalar institutional architecture of statehood. Accordingly, Shaw points out the various ways in which both municipal state forms and international organizations were subsumed within the organizational apparatuses of what he terms 'nation-state-empires' from the late nineteenth century to the mid-to late twentieth century. Concomitantly, Shaw emphasizes the ways in which municipal governments and the European Commission today remain largely subordinate to national state apparatuses (Shaw 2000: 190-1) .
In the present context, Shaw's layered conceptualization of modern statehood is particularly useful because it emphasizes (a) the multiscalar character of state power even under conditions in which a single scale predominates; and (b) the possibility that historically entrenched formations of state scalar organization may be qualitatively transformed. This conceptualization also implies that the substantive politico-institutional content of particular scales of state institutional organization and state regulatory activity likewise evolves historically. The regulatory functions, institutional expressions, and political significance of the supranational, national, regional, and local scales of statehood are thus likely to differ qualitatively according to the broader interscalar hierarchies in which they are embedded. Building upon the processual conceptualization of state space introduced previously, each scale of state power may be analyzed (a) in a narrow sense, with reference to its internal organizational form, institutional structure, and geographical boundaries; and (b) in an integral sense, with reference to its role as an arena for various forms of state intervention into socioeconomic life ( Fig. 3.3 This discussion has generated a number of initial methodological premises through which to approach the polymorphic, multiscalar, and continually changing geographies of state space under modern capitalism. These considerations open up two foundational questions. First, why does statehood under capitalism assume a specific spatial, territorial, and scalar form? Second, how and why has the spatial, territorial, and scalar configuration of statehood evolved during the history of capitalist development? Building towards an analysis of contemporary transformations of state space, the remainder of this chapter confronts each of these questions in turn.
State space as political strategy: a strategic-relational approach
There is an ever present tension in analyses of the capitalist state. On the one hand, it is vital to acknowledge historical-geographical specificities in the ways in which states are constituted [ . . . ] On the other hand, the universalizing effects of the capitalist mode of production mean that a theory of the capitalist state is both possible and necessary. There is [therefore] an unavoidable tension between the need for a general theory of 'form' (the separation of the political and economic spheres) and for a theory of historically and territorially specific national states within the shifting limits of that form.
Ray Hudson (2001: 55) As Hudson indicates, theorists of the capitalist state have long struggled to integrate arguments regarding the nature of the state form under capitalism and analyses of the historical evolution of specific state apparatuses within the capitalist geopolitical economy. Most traditions of state theory privilege one or the other side of this analytical divide. For instance, early Marxist state theorists and more recent contributors to the German state derivation debate focused their attention primarily on the question of how the forms and functions of state institutions (for instance, the separation of the economic and the political; and the role of state policies in promoting capital accumulation and in reproducing labor-power) are intertwined with the fundamental features of capitalism as a mode of production (such as private property relations, profit-driven production, intercapitalist competition, class domination, and the commodification of labor). 6 By contrast, other scholarly traditionsincluding historical sociology, institutionalist geopolitical economy, and French regulation theory-have directed attention to the diverse political and institutional arrangements upon which state power has been grounded under modern capitalist conditions.
7
A directly analogous tension between abstract-logical and concrete-historical modes of analysis necessarily accompanies any attempt to decipher the spatial form of statehood under capitalism (Collinge 1996) . Thus, while many theorists have emphasized the fundamental character of (national) state territoriality in the modern geopolitical order, other scholars have focused their attention upon the variegated political geographies that have crystallized in different national, regional, and local contexts and time-periods within that order.
8 While this tension is, as Hudson (2001: 55) rightly indicates, 'unavoidable', the task at hand is to confront it in a manner that can illuminate both the generic and the specific aspects of state spatiality under particular historical-geographical conditions. I propose to grapple with this issue by integrating questions of space, territoriality, and geographical scale, at a foundational level, into the strategicrelational approach to state theory developed by Jessop (1990a) . To this end, 6 For an excellent overview of these debates, see Jessop 1982. 7 The literature on state institutional evolution and comparative capitalisms is far too extensive to reference at length here. Representative contributions to this broad research field include Dyson 1982; Boyer and Hollingsworth 1997; Evans, Rueschemeyer, and Skocpol 1985; Lash and Urry 1987; Schwartz 1994; Tilly 1990; and Weiss and Hobson 1995. 8 Taylor's (1993) I first mobilize Jessop's strategic-relational framework in order to provide further theoretical grounding for the general arguments regarding the processual character of state spatiality that were developed in the preceding section. On this basis, I build upon Jessop's conceptualization of 'strategic selectivity' in order to specify some of the broad parameters within which state spatial configurations have evolved under modern capitalism. Through a spatialization of Jessop's approach to statehood, it will be possible to analyze, within a single analytical framework, both the state's general spatial form under capitalism and the historical variation of state spatial arrangements during the course of capitalist development. Most crucially, from this point of view, neither the state's spatial form nor historically specific forms of state spatiality are ever structurally pregiven; rather, they represent arenas and outcomes of spatially selective political strategies. This conceptualization forms a theoretical linchpin for the analysis of state rescaling that will be developed in subsequent chapters of this book.
The strategic-relational approach to state theory: an overview
According to Jessop (1990a) , the capitalist state must be viewed as an institutionally specific form of social relations. Just as the capital relation is constituted through value (in the sphere of production) and the commodity, price, and money (in the sphere of circulation), so too, Jessop maintains, is the state form constituted through its 'particularization' or institutional separation from the circuit of capital (Jessop 1990a: 206) . However, in Jessop's view, neither the value form nor the state form necessarily engender functionally unified, operationally cohesive, or organizationally coherent institutional arrangements (see also Poulantzas 1978) .
The value form is underdetermined insofar as its substance-the socially necessary labor time embodied in commodities-is contingent upon (a) class struggles in the sphere of production that condition capital's ability to subordinate labor power in the extraction of surplus value; (b) extra-economic class struggles that condition capital's ability to control labor power in the sphere of reproduction; and (c) the dynamics and intensity of intercapitalist competition (Jessop 1990a: 197-8) . Consequently, Jessop (1990a: 198) maintains, 'within the matrix established by the value-form there is real scope for variation in the rhythm and course of capitalist development'. According to Jessop, therefore, the relatively inchoate, contradictory matrix of social relations associated with the value form can only be translated into a system of reproducible institutional arrangements through the mobilization of accumulation strategies. In Jessop's (1990a: 198) terms, an accumulation strategy emerges when a model of economic growth is linked to a framework of institutions and state policies that are capable of reproducing it (see also Jessop et al. 1988: 158) . 9 Most crucially here, Jessop proposes a formally analogous argument regarding the state form, whose functional unity and organizational coherence are likewise understood to be deeply problematic. On the one hand, Jessop maintains, the establishment of a political sphere that is distinct from the spheres of production and circulation may be functional to capital insofar as states provide many of the extra-economic preconditions of successful capital accumulation. Various more concrete features of the state form may likewise contribute to this capitalist orientation, including the framework of bourgeois law, the operation of parliamentary politics, the nature of bureaucracy, the indirectness of state intervention in the economy, and the insulation of the state's economic and repressive organs from popular or legislative control (Jessop 1990a: 148) . On the other hand, however, Jessop (1990a: 206) insists that the state cannot serve as an ideal collective capitalist, for its very existence 'permits a dislocation between the activities of the state and the needs of capital'. In this sense, as Jessop (1990a: 148) has frequently reiterated, 'form problematizes function': the separation of the state from the circuit of capital may seriously constrain its ability to function as an agent of capitalist interests. Among many other factors, politically induced policy oscillations, bureaucratic inefficiency, and class struggles may undermine business confidence and disrupt the state's capacity to promote capital accumulation (Jessop 1990a: 148-9) .
Consequently, Jessop argues, the mere existence of the state as a distinctive form of social relations does not automatically translate into a coherent, coordinated, or reproducible framework of concrete state activities. On the contrary, the state form is an underdetermined condensation of continual strategic interactions regarding the nature of state intervention, political representation, and ideological hegemony within capitalist society. Accordingly, 'there can be no inherent substantive unity to the state qua institutional ensemble: its (always relative) unity must be created within the state system itself through specific operational procedures, means of coordination and guiding purposes' (Jessop 1990a: 346, 149, 161) . For Jessop, therefore, the functional unity and organizational coherence of the state are never pregiven, but must be viewed as emergent, contingent, contested, and potentially unstable outcomes of ongoing sociopolitical struggles between opposed social forces. Indeed, according to Jessop (1990a: 9, 346) , it is only through the mobilization and consolidation of state projects-which attempt to integrate state activities around a set of common, coherently articulated agendas-that the image of the state as a unified organizational entity ('state effects') can be projected into civil society.
10 State projects are thus formally analogous to accumulation strategies insofar as both represent strategic initiatives to institutionalize and reproduce the contradictory social forms (i.e. the value form and the state form) of modern capitalism. The key elements of this line of argumentation are summarized schematically in Fig. 3 .4.
Capitalism is grounded upon two major formdetermined social relations . . .
CAPITAL RELATION
Sphere of production
• Production is organized as a value relation in which (a) production is privately organized; (b) labor power isitself a commodity; and (c) producers struggle to reduce the socially necessary labor time required to produce commodities (i.e. by reducing costs and/or increasing outputs)
Sphere of circulation • The valorization of capital depends upon capital's ability to control wage labor in and outside the production process . . .
• Yet labor power is a 'fictitious commodity' insofar as the conditions of its commodification are a direct object of class struggle in and outside the sphere of production
• Capitalists share certain general interests in the reproduction of the capital relation ...
• Yet capitalists also compete over the particular conditions of capitalist reproduction
• It is on the basis of these considerations that Jessop introduces the concept of strategic selectivity, the goal of which is to develop a framework for analyzing the role of political strategies in forging the state's institutional structures and modes of socioeconomic intervention. Jessop concurs with Offe's (1984) well-known hypothesis that the state is endowed with selectivity-that is, with a tendency to privilege particular social forces, interests, and actors over others. According to Offe (1984: 120) , 'the institutional self-interest of the state in accumulation is conditioned by the fact that the state is denied the power to control the flow of those resources which are nevertheless indispensable for the exercise of state power'. This situation, Offe contends, causes the state systematically to privilege ruling-class interests and to exclude other social forces from the process of policymaking. For Jessop, however, the ruling class selectivity of state power is best understood as an object and outcome of ongoing sociopolitical struggles rather than as a structurally preinscribed feature of the state system. Accordingly, Jessop (1990a: 260) proposes that the state operates as 'the site, generator and the product of strategies'.
. The state is the site of strategies insofar as 'a given state form, a given form of regime, will be more accessible to some forces than others according to the strategies they adopt to gain state power' (Jessop 1990a: 260).
. The state is the generator of strategies because it serves as an institutional base through which diverse societal forces mobilize accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects.
. The state is the product of strategies because its own organizational structures and modes of socioeconomic intervention are inherited from earlier political strategies (Jessop 1990a: 261) .
In this manner, Jessop underscores the relational character of state strategic selectivity. The state's tendency to privilege certain class factions and social forces over others results from the evolving relationship between inherited state structures and emergent political strategies intended to harness state institutions towards particular socioeconomic projects.
The state strategies in question may be oriented towards a range of distinct socio-institutional targets. In particular, strategies oriented towards the state's own institutional structure may be distinguished from those strategies oriented towards the circuit of capital or the maintenance of hegemony within civil society. In Jessop's terminology, the former represent state projects whereas the latter represent state strategies. State projects aim to provide state institutions with some measure of functional unity, operational coordination, and organizational coherence. State projects are endowed with strategic selectivity insofar as particular social forces are privileged in the struggle to influence the evolving institutional structure of state power. When successful, state projects generate 'state effects' that endow the state apparatus with the appearance of unity, functional coherence, and organizational integration (Jessop 1990a: 6-9) . By contrast, state strategies represent initiatives to mobilize state institutions towards particular forms of socioeconomic intervention (Jessop 1990a: 260-1) . State strategies are endowed with strategic selectivity insofar as particular social forces are privileged in the struggle to influence the state's evolving role in regulating the circuit of capital and in the establishment of hegemony. When successful, state strategies result in the mobilization of relatively coherent accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects (Jessop 1990a: 196-219) . While state strategies generally presuppose the existence of a relatively coherent state project, there is no guarantee that state projects will effectively translate into viable state strategies. At the same time, when state strategies are mobilized successfully, they may also significantly modify the political and institutional terrain upon which state projects are articulated. The relationship between state projects and state strategies is thus a dialectical one insofar as they mutually condition and constrain one another (Fig. 3.5 ).
STATE PROJECTS
Initiatives to endow state institutions with organizational coherence, functional coordination, and operational unity: they target the state itself as a distinct institutional ensemble within the broader field of social forces
• Target: state institutions • Possible outcome: 'state effects'
STATE STRATEGIES
Initiatives to mobilize state institutions in order to promote particular forms of socioeconomic intervention: they focus upon the articulation of the state to non-state institutions and attempt to instrumentalize the state in order to regulate the circuit of capital and to modify the balance of forces within civil society In sum, in developing the notion of strategic selectivity, Jessop is concerned to emphasize the ways in which the state serves as a 'specific political form which offers structural privileges to some but not all kinds of political strategy' (Jessop 1990a: 270) . Rather than viewing selectivity as a pregiven structural feature of the state, Jessop contends that it results from a dialectic of strategic interaction and sociopolitical contestation within and beyond state institutions. In this view, ongoing social struggles mold (a) the state's evolving institutional structure and (b) the state's changing modes of economic intervention, accumulation strategies, and hegemonic projects. Just as crucially, the institutional ensemble in which this dialectic unfolds is viewed as an outgrowth of earlier rounds of political struggle regarding the forms and functions of state power. Accordingly, 'the state as such has no power-it is merely an institutional ensemble; it has only a set of institutional capacities and liabilities which mediate that power; the power of the state is the power of the forces acting in and through the state' (Jessop 1990a: 270) . The conception of the state as political strategy is thus intended to illuminate the complex interplay between these evolving institutional capacities/liabilities and the ensemble of social forces acting in and through state institutions.
Spatializing strategic-relational state theory: towards state spatial selectivity
In an insightful geographical reworking of Jessop's arguments, Jones (1999 Jones ( , 1997 has suggested that state institutions are endowed with distinctive spatial selectivities as well. For Jones (1997: 851), spatial selectivity refers to the processes of 'spatial privileging and articulation' through which state policies are differentiated across territorial space in order to target particular geographical zones and scales. In developing the concept of spatial selectivity, Jones (1999) underscores the ways in which the Thatcherite program of central-local restructuring and labor market intervention targeted highly specific spaces and scales for regulatory intervention. Jones (1997: 851) also notes a number of additional instances in which a state regime has systematically privileged particular spaces or articulated a policy agenda in spatially distinctive ways. Thus Gramsci's (1971) writings on the Southern Question emphasize the Italian state's central role in the production and reinforcement of a North-South divide during Italian industrialization. Likewise, Esser and Hirsch's (1989) analysis of Modell Deutschland in the 1980s emphasizes the regionally specific forms of political compromise that emerged during a period of intensive economic restructuring in the Federal Republic of Germany. Consequently, as Jones (1997: 853) emphasizes, space is not only a key dimension of state institutional organization, but frequently becomes an explicit object of state strategies as they target particular geographical areas, places, and scales. Figure 3 .6 (overleaf) summarizes the various dimensions of state selectivity-structural, strategic, and spatial-that have been examined so far in this discussion.
Building upon Jones's arguments, I suggest that Jessop's conceptualization of the state as political strategy can be fruitfully mobilized as a theoretical foundation for a spatialized and scale articulated conceptualization of statehood under modern capitalism. The methodological linchpin of this conceptualization is the proposition-presented schematically in the preceding section-that state spatiality is never permanently fixed but, like all other aspects of the state form, represents an emergent, strategically selective, and politically contested process. Jessop's strategic-relational approach provides a theoretical basis on which this proposition may be further elaborated.
As indicated, Jessop maintains that the organizational coherence, operational cohesion, and functional unity of the state are never structurally pregiven, but can be established only through the deployment of historically specific political strategies. This argument may also be fruitfully applied to the (Fig. 3.7) .
STATE FORM
The state apparatus is institutionally separated or 'particularized' from the circuit of capital
STATE SPATIAL FORM
Statehood is organized in the form of territorially centralized and self-enclosed units of political authority within an interstate system defined by formally equivalent political-territorial units
STATE PROJECTS STATE SPATIAL PROJECTS
The geographical cohesion of state space is never pregiven but is the product of specific programs and initiatives that The capacity of state institutions to promote particular forms of economic development and to maintain legitimation is never pregiven but is the product of particular programs and initiatives
State strategies emerge as attempts to impose particular forms of socioeconomic intervention
• Target: circuit of capital and civil society
• Possible outcomes: accumulation strategies and/or hegemonic projects Fig. 3 .7. A strategic-relational approach to state spatiality: a conceptual hierarchy 1. State spatial form. Just as the state form is defined by the institutional separation of a political sphere out of the circuit of capital, state spatial form is defined with reference to the principle of territoriality. Since the consolidation of the Westphalian geopolitical system in the seventeenth century, statehood has been organized in the form of formally equivalent, nonoverlapping, and territorially self-enclosed units of political authority. Throughout the history of state development in the modern world system, the geography of statehood has been defined, at core, by this territorialization of collectively binding decision-making powers within a global interstate system (Ruggie 1993; Sack 1986). Indeed, the territorially centralized spatial form of statehood has been an essential condition of possibility for the separation of the economic and the political under capitalism, for it is territoriality that underpins the potential autonomy of state institutions from other social forces within civil society (Mann 1988; Poulantzas 1978) . Even in the current era, as national state borders have become increasingly permeable to supranational flows, territoriality arguably remains the most essential attribute of state spatial form, the underlying geographical matrix within which state regulatory activities are articulated.
2. State spatial projects. As indicated, the organizational coherence and functional unity of the state form can be secured only through state projects that attempt to 'impart a specific strategic direction to the individual or collective activities of [the state's] different branches' (Jessop 1990a: 268) . A formally analogous argument can be made with regard to state spatial form. Whereas territoriality represents the underlying geographical terrain in which state action occurs, its coherence as a framework of political regulation can be secured only through state spatial projects that differentiate state activities among different levels of territorial administration and coordinate state policies among diverse locations and scales. State spatial projects thus represent initiatives to differentiate state territoriality into a partitioned, functionally coordinated, and organizationally coherent regulatory geography. On the most basic level, state spatial projects are embodied in the state's internal scalar division among distinct tiers of administration, as defined by subnational, provincial, regional, metropolitan, and local territorial boundaries. This scalar differentiation of statehood occurs in close conjunction with intergovernmental projects to coordinate administrative practices, fiscal relations, political representation, service provision, and regulatory activities among and within each level of state power. State spatial projects may also entail programs to modify the geographical structure of intergovernmental arrangements (for instance, by altering administrative boundaries) or to reconfigure their rules of operation (for instance, through centralization or decentralization measures). In this sense, state spatial projects represent the strategic expressions of state space in the narrow sense, as described in the preceding section: they are oriented most directly towards state institutions themselves as relatively centralized, institutionally distinct, and scale articulated apparatuses of political authority within a given territory.
3. State spatial strategies. As we saw above, the capacity of state institutions to promote particular forms of economic intervention and to maintain societal legitimation can emerge only through the successful mobilization of state strategies. Analogous arguments can be made to characterize state strategies to influence the geographies of industrial development, infrastructure investment, and sociopolitical struggle. For, just as state institutions play a central role in the elaboration of accumulation strategies and hegemonic projects, so too do they intervene extensively to reshape the geographies of capital accumulation and political struggle. However, state capacities to engage in these forms of spatial intervention, and thus to establish a 'structured coherence' for capitalist growth within national, regional, and local economies (Harvey 1989b), can emerge only through the successful mobilization of state spatial strategies. State spatial strategies are articulated through a range of policy instruments, including industrial policies, economic development initiatives, infrastructure investments, spatial planning programs, labor market policies, regional policies, urban policies, and housing policies. State spatial strategies are also embodied in the territorial differentiation of policy regimes within state boundaries and in the differential place-, territory-, and scale-specific effects of those policies. State institutions do not contain a pregiven structural orientation towards any specific scale, place, or location; however, determinate forms of state spatial and scalar selectivity emerge insofar as social forces successfully mobilize state spatial strategies that privilege particular spaces over against others. Moreover, because state policies always engender divergent, contextually specific impacts upon diverse scales and locations within each national territory, there is an inherent tendency to geographical variation among state activities (Duncan, Goodwin, and Halford 1988). Whereas some state spatial strategies may explicitly promote this uneven development of regulation, this may also occur as an unintended side-effect of state operations (Jones 1997). State spatial strategies can thus be viewed as the strategic embodiment of state space in the integral sense, as defined above: they attempt to influence the geographies of social and economic relations, beyond the state apparatus proper, within a given territorial jurisdiction. Figure 3 .8 (overleaf) summarizes the structural and strategic moments of state spatiality under capitalism. This figure illustrates how the structural distinction between state space in the narrow sense and state space in the integral sense is paralleled on a strategic level by that between state spatial projects and state spatial strategies.
In sum, Jessop's strategic-relational conceptualization of capitalist states may be expanded to provide the foundations for a 'strategic-relational-spatial' framework for state theory. In this conception, the geographies of statehood under modern capitalism represent expressions of a dialectical interplay between inherited partitionings/scalings of political space and emergent state spatial projects/strategies that aim to reshape the latter. State spatiality can be conceived as a contested, multiscalar politico-institutional terrain on which diverse social forces attempt to influence the geographies of state territorial organization and state regulatory activity. On the one hand, through the mobilization of state spatial projects, such struggles focus upon the state's own territorial and scalar configuration. On the other hand, through the mobilization of state spatial strategies, such struggles also focus upon the geographies of state intervention into socioeconomic life. And finally, as emphasized above, the framework of state spatiality in which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are mobilized is itself the contested institutional product of earlier rounds of regulatory experimentation and sociopolitical struggle. The spatial selectivity of specific state institutional forms may thus be understood as an expression of the continual, dialectical interaction between entrenched configurations of state spatiality and ongoing struggles to influence, modify, or transform such configurations.
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Extending state spatial selectivity: parameters, evolution, transformation 
Parameters of state spatial selectivity under modern capitalism
According to Mann (1993) , modern states have been configured in a variety of politico-institutional 'crystallizations' that reflect the divergent political, economic, military, and ideological agendas that are promoted through state policies. The spatial configuration of state power under modern capitalism has likewise exhibited tremendous variation across historical and geographical contexts. I would argue, however, that the variation of state spatial selectivity cannot be explained entirely with reference to the divergent political agendas and geographical orientations of the various social forces acting in and through the state. For such agendas and orientations have in turn been circumscribed within certain determinate institutional parameters associated with (a) the distinctively territorial form of statehood under modern capitalism; and (b) the endemic problem of regulating uneven spatial development within a capitalist space-economy. First, state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have evolved within determinate institutional parameters associated with the modern state's underlying territorial form. Because modern statehood is constituted, on a fundamental level, with reference to the territorial centralization of collectively binding decision-making powers (Mann 1988), state spatial projects and state spatial strategies necessarily target institutional arrangements or socioeconomic relations situated within the bounded space of their political jurisdictions, or some portion thereof. This targeting and molding of politicaleconomic relations generally transpires along two core axes of variation-. a scalar dimension in which state institutions and policies are differentiated hierarchically among a variety of scales within a given territory; and . a territorial dimension in which state institutions and policies are differentiated areally among different types of jurisdictional units or socioeconomic zones within a given territory.
I shall refer to the former axis of variation as the scalar articulation of state space and to the latter axis of variation as the territorial articulation of state space.
As we shall see in subsequent chapters, each of these axes is the site of deep tensions and conflicts in which diverse social forces struggle over the geographical configuration of state institutions and over the form of state spatial intervention. State spatial selectivity must be viewed, simultaneously, as an inherited framework of state spatial organization/intervention within which such struggles emerge and as the very medium in which they are fought out.
Second, state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have evolved in close conjunction with the uneven geographies of capitalist development. As indicated in Ch. 1, the process of capitalist industrialization generates continually changing patterns of uneven spatial development as particular places and scales are privileged, subordinated, or marginalized during successive phases of economic growth (Smith 1990; Storper and Walker 1989) . The geographies of state power do not passively reflect these patterns of uneven spatial development, but mediate and modify them in significant ways.
. State institutions provide territorially partitioned and scale articulated regulatory landscapes within which processes of capital circulation are embedded and continually reinscribed. Consequently, each formation of uneven spatial development is conditioned in key ways by the geographies of state power.
. State institutions may be harnessed in order to influence the geographies of uneven development, for they 'are invaluable in helping dominant groups organize and manage the increasingly large scale, differentiated and changing social systems of capitalism ' (Duncan, Goodwin, and Halford 1988: 109) . Under some conditions, state institutions may be mobilized in order to alleviate territorial inequalities, but they may also be mobilized in ways that intensify such patterns or modify the form in which they are articulated (Duncan, Goodwin, and Halford 1988) . While some social forces may favor patterns of uneven spatial development that privilege specific locations or scales into which they have sunk large investments or to which they have a strong cultural attachment, the resultant forms of territorial inequality may also generate major legitimation problems to the extent that they are politicized (Hudson 2001).
Consequently, the relation of state institutions to patterns of uneven spatial development is frequently an object of intense sociopolitical contestation. While state institutions may actively contribute to the establishment of a spatial fix for capitalist growth, in which the contradictions of capitalism are temporarily displaced (Harvey 1982) , such an outcome is by no means preordained. Indeed, insofar as state institutions may also be harnessed in ways that exacerbate uneven spatial development, they may seriously exacerbate, rather than displace, capital's endemic crisis-tendencies and contradictions (see Ch. 6). Figure 3 .9 synthesizes these distinctions in order to specify the determinate scalar and territorial parameters within which state spatial selectivity has • Promotion of patchy, differentiated, or uneven administrative geographies in which customized, area-specific institutional arrangements and levels of service provision are established in specific places or geographic zones within a territory (4) Equalization vs. concentration
• Promotion of an equalization of socioeconomic activities and investments within the state's territorial borders: goal is to spread socioeconomic assets and public resources as evenly as possible across a national territory and thus to alleviate territorial inequalities
• Promotion of a concentration of socioeconomic activities and investments: goal is to promote the agglomeration of socioeconomic assets and public resources in particular locations, places, and regions within a territory Fig. 3.9 . Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (1) evolved during the course of modern capitalist development. As the figure indicates, these parameters are defined, on the one hand, by the changing forms of state spatial organization within a given territory (state space in the narrow sense), whether with reference to the hierarchical nesting of state power among different geographical scales or to its areal articulation across different types of locations, places, and regions. On the other hand, Fig. 3 .9 also specifies some of the ways in which states may attempt to influence the geographies of uneven spatial development within their territories (state space in the integral sense), whether by promoting the rearticulation of socioeconomic activities among different scales or by redistributing them across different types of locations, places, and regions. The cells of the figure illustrate (a) some of the core tensions around which state spatial projects and state spatial strategies have been articulated; and (b) the scale-and area-specific patterns of state territorial organization and state spatial intervention that may emerge through such struggles.
Cell 1: the scalar articulation of state spatial projects
An examination of the scalar dimension of state spatial projects reveals an endemic tension between the drive to centralize state operations at a single overarching scale (generally the national) and the impulse to decentralize or disperse them among multiple levels of political authority. The interplay between these competing approaches to state spatial organization has generated historically specific institutional hierarchies in which political power is more or less concentrated around a single, overarching tier. While state operations were increasingly centralized at a national scale during much of the history of capitalist development, projects of decentralization have generated significant institutional realignments and rescalings during the last thirty years, both in unitary and federal states (Bennett 1993 (Bennett , 1989 Sellers 2002) . In the contemporary EU, the consolidation of multilevel governance systems has further advanced this simultaneous denationalization and decentralization of state scalar organization relative to the more centralized formations of state spatiality that prevailed across western Europe under Fordist-Keynesian capitalism (Bullmann 1994; Scharpf 1999) .
Cell 2: the territorial articulation of state spatial projects
An examination of the territorial dimension of state spatial projects reveals an analogous, and equally endemic, tension between the agenda of promoting administrative uniformity across an entire territory and the goal of establishing customized, area-specific administrative arrangements within different types of locations, places, and regions within that territory. The French Revolution and the subsequent wave of Napoleonic administrative reforms during the early nineteenth century entailed a dismantling of the relatively patchy, uneven, and erratic political geographies associated with late feudal and early industrial states. Subsequently, more uniform frameworks of territorial administration were introduced and generalized across much of western Europe (Bennett 1993) . By the second industrial revolution of the early twentieth century, largescale bureaucratic hierarchies had been established through a variety of rationalizing state spatial projects in most western European countries (Cerny 1995). Within these relatively centralized, standardized frameworks of national territorial administration, each scale of state power was equipped with formally equivalent politico-institutional arrangements. With the consolidation of Keynesian welfare national states during the postwar period, subnational administrative tiers were charged with the task of maintaining minimum standards of public welfare and social service provision in their territorial jurisdictions (see Ch. 4). During the last three decades, however, this longrun historical trend towards administrative uniformity and standardization has been unsettled through a variety of state spatial projects oriented towards a diametrically opposed, increasingly differentiated configuration of state space. Within this countervailing model, strategic locations within a national territory-such as capital cities, major metropolitan centers, and high-technology zones-are equipped with customized, place-or scale-specific administrative arrangements that are considered to be suited to their own particular circumstances and socioeconomic assets. Across western Europe, these projects of institutional customization have significantly undermined the uniformity of national administrative arrangements and have engendered markedly divergent levels of public service provision across each territory in which they have been mobilized (see Ch. 5). An analogous periodization of state spatial development emerges when we consider the historical evolution of state spatial strategies under modern capitalism. As with state spatial projects, state spatial strategies can be classified with reference to their scalar and territorial dimensions.
Cell 3: the scalar articulation of state spatial strategies
An examination of the scalar dimension of state spatial strategies reveals an endemic tension between the agenda of promoting a single scale as the overarching focal point for political-economic life (scalar singularity) and that of distributing political-economic activities in a more variegated manner, among multiple spatial scales within or beyond a given territory (scalar multiplicity). This tension between state strategies intended to promote scalar singularity and state strategies intended to promote scalar multiplicity is formally similar to that between administrative centralization and decentralization, as discussed above. In this case, however, the key issue is not which scale of state territorial organization is accorded primacy, but rather which scale of capital accumulation-and of socioeconomic relations more generally-is privileged through state operations. Much of the history of state formation has involved a process of nationalization in which national states have promoted the national scale as the primary focal point for socioeconomic life (Lefebvre 1978; Poulantzas 1978) . However, more recent rescaling processes have engendered a rejigging of these inherited, nationalized scalar geographies as supranational and subnational layers of state power have acquired a growing strategic importance in the reproduction of capital. Under these conditions, the national state's traditional strategy of promoting scalar singularity within a relatively self-enclosed, autocentric national economy is being superseded by the problem of managing a situation of scalar multiplicity in which (a) supranational and subnational levels of political-economic organization are acquiring an enhanced regulatory significance; and (b) sociopolitical struggles are proliferating, in and outside the state apparatus, to influence the ongoing rearticulation of inherited scalar arrangements (Brenner et al. 2003a ).
Cell 4: the territorial articulation of state spatial strategies
Finally, an examination of the territorial dimension of state spatial strategies reveals a tension between the priority of spreading socioeconomic activities evenly across a national territory (equalization) and that of channeling them into particular types of locations, places, and regions within that territory (concentration). 12 The tension between equalizing, balancing state spatial strategies, and differentiating, concentrating state spatial strategies is formally analogous to that between administrative uniformity and administrative customization, as discussed above. In this case, however, the key issue is not how the state should territorialize its own administrative and regulatory functions, but rather how it should (re)configure the geographies of capital accumulation and socioeconomic activity within its territorial borders. During the course of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, western European national states attempted to extend their regulatory control over all locations, places, regions, and scales within their territorial boundaries (Lefebvre 1978) . It was during this period, for instance, that national states began to channel substantial resources into the construction of large-scale public or quasi-public infrastructures throughout their territories, including ports, canals, bridges, tunnels, railroads, housing facilities, public utilities systems, and communications networks (Graham and Marvin 2001: 73-81) . This massive extension of state investments in the spatial infrastructure for capital circulation was also closely intertwined with new patterns of intra-national territorial inequality 12 In his classic contribution to regional economic theory, Rich Lands and Poor, Myrdal (1957: 44) recognized this tension as follows: 'From the earliest times national states, when they came into being, almost always relied partly upon popular appeal and therefore almost always exerted a certain amount of countervailing power against the tendency to regional inequality. Every national state took some responsibility for common services and for building roads and raising the level of technology in the backward regions-though ordinarily in a poor country a disproportionate part of the meager public funds devoted to such purposes served the richer regions. In the planning of railways, considerations of short-term profitability [ . . . ] worked to the advantage of the richer regions. But from the beginning in most countries another purpose was also operative, namely, to open up underdeveloped regions [ . . . ] The same applies to the building of electrical power stations and distribution networks [ . . . ] . ' and sociospatial polarization, as some places and regions were systematically privileged over others as targets for state-subsidized or state-financed capital investments. With the consolidation of Keynesian welfare national states during the second half of the twentieth century, states began to mobilize a variety of compensatory regional and social policies designed to spread industry, population, and infrastructural investment more evenly throughout their territories, and thus to alleviate inherited patterns of uneven spatial development (see Ch. 4). However, since the 1970s, in a trend paralleling that towards enhanced administrative customization, the project of promoting spatial equalization at a national scale has been largely abandoned. Instead, western European national states have attempted to rechannel major public resources and infrastructural investments into the most globally competitive cities and regions within their territories (Brenner 1999b (Brenner , 1998b . The crisis of redistributive approaches to territorial regulation during the post-1970s period, and the subsequent mobilization of reterritorialized, rescaled, and place-specific forms of socioeconomic policy, is one of the key transformations of state spatiality that will be investigated in Ch. 5 below.
For analytical purposes, I have thus far distinguished the scalar and territorial dimensions of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies, treating them as if they were separate components within each formation of state spatial selectivity. I have adopted this analytical procedure in order to illustrate the conceptual distinctions introduced in Fig. 3 .9. However, it is crucial to underscore that actually existing formations of state spatiality are produced through historically and contextually specific combinations of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies.
. As indicated in the previous section, state spatial projects and state spatial strategies co-evolve relationally, through a mutually transformative dialectic. Frameworks of state territorial organization generally facilitate determinate forms of state spatial intervention while excluding others. Meanwhile, the introduction of new forms of state spatial intervention generally hinges upon, and may in turn accelerate, the reworking of state territorial organization (K. Cox 1990).
. The scalar and territorial dimensions of state space do not exist in ontologically separate realms but are, in practice, tightly intermeshed. Thus, the rescaling of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies generally has immediate ramifications for the territorial articulation of state space as a whole. Concomitantly, when the areal configuration of state space is reterritorialized, state scalar configurations are also generally modified.
It should be recognized, finally, that determinate types of state spatial projects generally emerge in close conjunction with particular types of state spatial strategies. These interdependencies among particular types of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are illustrated schematically in Fig. 3 . State spatial projects to promote administrative centralization are generally aligned with state spatial strategies to promote scalar singularity (Fig. 3.10 , top of vertical axis).
. State spatial projects to promote administrative decentralization are generally aligned with state spatial strategies to promote scalar multiplicity (bottom of vertical axis).
. State spatial projects to promote administrative uniformity are generally intertwined with state spatial strategies to promote an equalization of socioeconomic activities across a territory (left side of horizontal axis).
. State spatial projects to promote administrative differentiation are generally intertwined with state spatial strategies to concentrate socioeconomic activities at specific locations within a territory (right side of horizontal axis). Figure 3 .10 provides a schematic analytical grid through which to examine different historical forms of state spatial selectivity. The key task, in each case, is to position the state spatial projects and state spatial strategies associated with a particular historical formation of state spatiality on the scalar (vertical) and territorial (horizontal) axes represented in the figure. On this basis, the geographies of state space can be decoded as complex amalgamations-that is, as products, arenas, and catalysts-of particular types of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies that are articulated at a variety of scales and differentiated among distinct territorial locations. In principle, any formation of state spatiality could be examined through this conceptual scheme by being positioned appropriately within one of the analytical quadrants along each of the axes depicted.
Crucially, however, the purpose of this framework is not to classify formations of state spatiality in a static manner, as if the latter were composed of neatly isolated, permanently ossified institutional components. Rather, by building upon and concretizing the processual conceptualization of state spatiality introduced earlier, this model is intended as a basis for investigating the dynamic historical evolution of state spatial forms in relation to ongoing processes of capitalist restructuring. The framework presented in Fig. 3 .10 may thus be deployed most fruitfully not by positioning particular state forms at isolated 'points' within the grid, but rather by specifying the determinate evolutionary pathways along which historically and contextually specific forms of state spatial restructuring have unfolded. This methodological strategy is represented in Fig. 3 .11 (overleaf), which outlines the general parameters for state spatial change within the modern interstate system through a series of diagonal arrows stretching from the upper left quadrant to the bottom left quadrant.
The diagonal arrows are positioned so as to demarcate a variety of possible trajectories along which processes of state spatial restructuring might be expected to unfold. The bottom left and upper right corners of Fig. 3 .11 have been blocked out, because they correspond to articulations among the territorial and scalar dimensions of state space that are either logically impossible Fig. 3.11 . Parameters for the evolution of state spatial selectivity (3) or empirically improbable. As the diagonal arrows in Fig. 3 .11 indicate, pathways of state spatial restructuring may be articulated within a given quadrant, but, under conditions of systemic change or crisis, they may also traverse from one quadrant to another. This latter proposition, along with the more general notion that processes of state spatial restructuring unfold along distinctive institutional and geographical pathways, can now be developed more concretely.
Towards an investigation of state spatial restructuring: a research hypothesis
In the preceding chapter, I argued against conceptions of contemporary globalization as a process of deterritorialization by underscoring the essential role of state institutions in mediating, shaping, and animating contemporary geoeconomic transformations at a variety of spatial scales. In that context, I also suggested that the active involvement of state institutions in these transformations has been closely intertwined with major political, institutional, and geographical realignments of state power itself. One of the central arguments of this book is that the nationally organized formation of state spatiality that prevailed throughout western Europe during the postwar, Fordist-Keynesian period has been systematically reorganized during the last thirty years. The expanded conceptualization of state spatial selectivity developed above provides a useful basis on which to explore more concretely the major institutional and geographical parameters within which this rescaling of statehood has been unfolding.
Across western Europe, the geographies of Fordist-Keynesian states were quite multifaceted and did not correspond to a single, generic model of political space or institutional organization. Throughout the 'golden age' of postwar capitalism, considerable variation obtained among state spatial projects and state spatial strategies within different types of western European states. Levels of bureaucratic centralization and administrative uniformity differed among unitary and federal systems; the extent of economic nationalization differed among smaller, more open states and larger, more autocentric states; and strategies to promote a spatial equalization of socioeconomic activities likewise differed according to contextually specific circumstances, territorial arrangements, and political alliances. However, even in the absence of a complete political-geographic convergence, broadly analogous formations of state spatial selectivity crystallized across western Europe during the FordistKeynesian period. Building upon the analytical framework introduced above, the general parameters within which the geographies of Fordist-Keynesian states evolved during the postwar period are depicted in the inverted L-shaped quadrant on the upper left side of Fig. 3 .12 (overleaf). My argument, then, is not that the state spaces of Fordist-Keynesian capitalism converged around a single, generic model. I am suggesting, rather, that broadly analogous state spatial projects and state spatial strategies were consolidated during this period, leading in turn to distinctive institutional and geographical homologies among national states that were otherwise characterized by significant historical, political, and cultural differences (see Ch. 4). Figure 3 .12 also points towards a closely analogous interpretation of the new state spaces that have been emerging across western Europe since the 1970s. Here, too, there has been considerable institutional variation across national contexts, depending upon (a) the specific configuration of state spatiality that was inherited from the Fordist-Keynesian period, and (b) the specific types of . This development has resulted from the widespread mobilization of (a) state spatial projects oriented towards administrative differentiation and decentralization; and (b) state spatial strategies oriented towards the differentiation of socioeconomic activities within a national territory and towards the management of scalar multiplicity (see Ch. 5). Figure 3 .12 depicts this profound reworking of state spatial selectivity in contemporary western Europe through the three diagonal arrows stretching from the upper left to the bottom right. Transformations within any of the basic parameters of state spatial selectivity have not occurred simultaneously or coevally. On the contrary, they have generally occurred at markedly different rhythms, in divergent institutional patterns, and with quite variegated political-economic consequences across western European national states. This means that, even among national states that appear to be experiencing formally analogous institutional and spatial realignments, substantively different geographies of state spatial organization and state spatial intervention are frequently produced. For this reason, the newly emergent state spaces depicted in Fig. 3 .12 are not enclosed within determinate borders. While these emergent forms of state space may be expected to be positioned within, or close to, the analytical zone encircled around the phrase 'new state spaces', they should be viewed as the outcomes of multiple tendencies of state spatial restructuring whose precise institutional and geographical contours remain deeply contested and thus highly unstable. Accordingly, Fig. 3 .12 is intended as no more than an initial, schematic outline of the broad parameters within which new state spaces are currently emerging. It is presented here as a research hypothesis for the study of new state spaces that flows from the expanded conceptualization of state spatial selectivity introduced previously. In subsequent chapters, I elaborate and concretize this hypothesis by investigating the role of urban policy as a key mechanism of state spatial restructuring.
Path-dependency and 'layered' regulation: conceptualizing state spatial restructuring
The restructuring of state spatiality rarely entails the complete dissolution of entrenched political geographies. For, as Lipietz (1992a) indicates, human beings do not create new sociospatial structures under conditions of their own choosing. Rather, all social actors are circumscribed in their projects to remake territory, regions, place, and scale by sociospatial configurations inherited from the past, which serve simultaneously as constraints upon future developments and as openings for the latter. For this reason, the restructuring of state spatiality is uneven, discontinuous, and unpredictable: it is best conceived as a layering process in which newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies are superimposed upon entrenched morphologies of state spatial organization. Thus conceived, the spatiality of state power is at once a presupposition, a medium, and a product of the conflictual interplay between inherited geographical parcelizations of state space and emergent political strategies intended to instrumentalize, restructure, or transform the latter towards particular sociopolitical ends. Massey's (1985: 119) concept of 'layers of investment' within the economic landscape provides an apt metaphor for deciphering this unpredictable interplay between inherited spatial arrangements and emergent political strategies. For Massey, the economic geography of capitalism is embodied within historically specific rounds of investment in the locational infrastructure of industrial production. The resultant spatial divisions of labor are derived from earlier rounds of investment and are modified continually as firms forge new locational geographies in response to class struggle, intercapitalist competition, and technological change. In Massey's framework, therefore, layers of investment represent, simultaneously (a) the ossified geographical legacy of earlier historical rounds of industrial growth, (b) the geographical basis for current spatial divisions of labor, and (c) an emergent, constantly changing locational surface on which new economic geographies are forged.
By building upon the strategic-relational-spatial approach to state theory developed above, processes of state spatial restructuring may be analyzed in closely analogous terms. In this conception, processes of state spatial restructuring may likewise be understood as a continual 'layering' of successive rounds of state regulation within a constantly evolving mosaic of state spatiality (see Peck 1998: 29).
. Just as spatial structures of production lay the basis for the geography of economic activities within a given historical conjuncture, so too do entrenched configurations of state spatiality provide a relatively partitioned, differentiated geography for the articulation of state regulatory activities. Spatial divisions of (state) regulation are thus directly analogous to spatial divisions of labor insofar as both entail determinate articulations and differentiations of particular types of social relations-whether of capitalist production or of state regulation-over an uneven territorial surface and within a chronically unstable scalar hierarchy.
. Just as new rounds of investment in the economic landscape transform the locational surface of capitalist production and thus trigger a further differentiation of spatial divisions of labor, so too do state spatial projects and state spatial strategies continually transform the political geographies of state regulation, and thus engender shifts within the state's own territorial and scalar architecture. State spatial projects and state spatial strategies may therefore be conceptualized dynamically, as the catalysts of successive 'rounds' of state spatial regulation in which multiple emergent (areal and scalar) layers of state regulatory activity are incrementally superimposed upon historically inherited geographies of state space.
This model of state spatial restructuring is depicted schematically in Fig. 3.13 .
Two crucial methodological consequences follow from this conceptualization. ( I n t e r a c t i o n e f f e c t s ) between different areas'. Analogously, processes of state spatial restructuring are likely to generate radically different outcomes in divergent institutional and spatial contexts, depending on the contextually specific ways in which inherited and emergent regulatory geographies interact. Peck (1998: 29) explains this point as follows:
The process by which new geographies of governance are formed is not a pseudogeological one in which a new layer (or round of regulation) supersedes the old, to form a new institutional surface [ . . . ] Geographies of governance are made at the point of interaction between the unfolding layer of regulatory processes / apparatuses and the inherited institutional landscape. The unfolding layer . . . only becomes an on-theground reality through this process of interaction.
From this perspective, then, each new round of state spatial regulation generates a contextually specific interaction between regulatory layers, leading in turn to new, place-, jurisdiction-, and scale-specific forms of spatial differentiation and uneven development within the regulatory architecture of statehood (see also Duncan and Goodwin 1989; MacKinnon 2001) .
2. Path-dependency and the juxtaposition of spatial structures. All dimensions of state spatial structure do not change simultaneously or in organizationally isomorphic patterns. Indeed, much like the early settlement morphologies of major industrial cities whose underlying contours have been preserved through successive rounds of economic growth and sociospatial restructuring (Abu-Lughod 1999), certain ossified layers of state spatial regulation may remain entrenched, even as surrounding layers are reworked. For, as with many other sociohistorical processes, such as technological development and institutional restructuring (North 1990; Pierson 2000) , the evolution of state spatiality is strongly path-dependent insofar as many of its fundamental characteristics may be reproduced, reinforced, and even locked in during the process of historical development. For instance, many of the constitutional, administrative, and territorial structures forged during the early nineteenth century-whether of a Napoleonic, unitary, or federal character-continue to undergird significant aspects of state space even within post-Fordist Europe (Bennett 1989) . Analogously, the scalar configuration of state spatiality has likewise been characterized by a strongly path-dependent developmental trajectory. As we have seen, the national scale of statehood has served as the predominant locus of territorial administration, regulatory activity, and sociopolitical struggle, both in western Europe and elsewhere, throughout much of the geohistory of modern statehood. It is only relatively recently in the history of state spatial development that this nationalized scalar hierarchy of state power has been destabilized and reworked. The organization of state space at any historical conjuncture therefore represents a multilayered, polymorphic mosaic in which political geographies established at different moments of historical time are interwoven. Just as the spatial imprint of earlier rounds of capitalist industrialization is evident within the built environment of most contemporary cities, the architecture of state spatiality likewise bears the unmistakable territorial markings of earlier regulatory projects, institutional compromises, and political struggles.
A key task that flows from a strategic-relational-spatial approach to statehood is to investigate the path-dependent layering processes through which successive rounds of state spatial regulation emerge within entrenched formations of state spatiality. New territorial and scalar geographies of state power are forged through a contested, open-ended interaction of historically inherited configurations of state spatial organization with newly emergent state spatial projects and state spatial strategies at various geographical scales.
Summary and conclusion
The starting point for this chapter was the challenge of escaping the 'territorial trap' (Agnew 1994) that has long underpinned mainstream approaches to state theory, political sociology, and political economy. Against this background, I have elaborated the theoretical foundations for a processual approach to the production of state spatiality. From this perspective, state institutions do not merely exist 'in' pregiven territorial containers. Rather, state institutions must be conceived as multiscalar sociospatial configurations that evolve historically, often in ways that have significant ramifications for the geographical configuration of capitalism as a whole. Concomitantly, the process of state intervention does not occur on a flat, contourless plane of social relations but is always articulated in spatially selective forms that target diverse places, territories, and scales for particular types of state operations. As Lefebvre (2003a: 85) once remarked, space is one of the 'privileged instruments' of state institutions as they are mobilized to regulate the social relations of capitalism. In short, within modern capitalism, statehood is configured in a geographically differentiated form; at the same time, as state institutions are harnessed to regulate the uneven geographies of political-economic life, they engage continuously in the production and transformation of places, regions, territories, and scalar hierarchies. As diverse social forces struggle to mobilize state institutions towards their own ends, state space is continuously reconfigured, whether through explicit projects to reorganize the geographies of state territorial organization and state intervention, or as indirect outcomes of ongoing regulatory experiments and sociopolitical conflicts.
I have theorized the state spatial process under capitalism through a spatialization of Jessop's strategic-relational approach to state theory. By conceiving state space, at once in its narrow and integral senses, as an arena, generator, and product of historically specific political strategies, it is possible to explore the changing geographical dimensions of state power in historical and contemporary perspective. On this basis, I have developed an expanded conception of state spatial selectivity that encompasses the role of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies in the production of historically specific formations of state space. I have suggested that state spatial restructuring under capitalism unfolds within certain determinate institutional parameters defined by the underlying territorial form of modern statehood and by the chronic problem of regulating uneven spatial development within each state territory. By distinguishing state spatial projects and state spatial strategies along scalar and territorial axes, this chapter has proposed a methodological framework through which to investigate the path-dependent historical evolution of state spatiality within those broad institutional parameters. These arguments have also provided the theoretical grounding for a number of general propositions regarding the transformation of state space in western Europe since the crisis of the Fordist-Keynesian accumulation regime in the mid-1970s. As developed here, the concepts of state spatial projects and state spatial strategies may be deployed not only to specify the form of state spatial selectivity associated with Keynesian welfare national states, but also to demarcate some of the broad tendencies of state spatial restructuring that have crystallized across western Europe during the last three decades. Finally, I have suggested that state spatial restructuring does not entail a unilinear replacement of one institutionalgeographical configuration by another, fully formed framework of state space. It occurs, rather, through a conflictual, unevenly articulated, and pathdependent interaction between inherited patterns of state spatial organization and emergent projects to reconfigure the latter. The interface between inherited and emergent state spaces therefore represents a key focal point for further research on the state spatial process under capitalism.
A number of research questions regarding the production of state space may be derived from this theoretical framework. First, one could investigate the interplay between state spatial projects and state spatial strategies under specific historical-geographical conditions, exploring the ways in which forms of state territorial organization and patterns of state spatial intervention reciprocally shape and constrain one another. Second, one could investigate the evolution of specific dimensions of state spatiality-for instance, territoriality, spatial divisions of regulation, place-specific forms of governance, or the scalar articulation of state operations-during the process of capitalist development. Third, one could investigate the evolution of the aforementioned aspects of state spatiality in relation to specific regulatory problems under capitalismfor instance, those associated with capital accumulation, social reproduction, political legitimation, and so forth. Finally, one could investigate the role of diverse social forces-including classes, class factions, political coalitions, and social movements-in shaping state spatial projects and state spatial strategies, as well as the ways in which the resultant configurations of state spatial organization in turn mold the geographies of territorial alliance formation, sociopolitical mobilization, and contention.
Each of these questions is centrally relevant for my purposes in subsequent chapters. However, my overarching aim in this book is to investigate the evolution of state spatiality in relation to the major regulatory problems generated through the process of capitalist urbanization since the FordistKeynesian period. The next chapter elaborates this agenda in three intertwined steps-first, by exploring the interface between urbanization processes and state spatial development under modern capitalism; second, by analyzing the nationalized formation of urban governance and state spatial regulation that crystallized across western Europe during the course of the postwar period; and third, by examining the systemic breakdown of the postwar configuration of state spatiality following the global economic crises of the early 1970s.
